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THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF
BUDDHIST TIBET

R e b e cca R. Fren c h

rom

March 3 through March 7, 1994, The Divinity School, the Institute for the

Advanced Study of Religion, and the Workshop on Buddhist Intellectual Practice of the
University, hosted the Numata Conference on Religion and Law in Southeast Asia.
The following is excerpted from a paper delivered on March 4, 1994. •
In the effort to think anew about the
relationship between secular law and
Buddhist law, as well as the relationship
between traditional and modern concepts of civic religion, I will present secular Tibetan law as it ex isted
during the reign of the Dalai Lamas, a new and engaging
topic in Buddhist studies. My first goal will be to discuss
briefl y the organization and administration of the Tibetan
secular legal system, the roles of officials and legal representatives, some jurisprudential concepts and the law codes.
A second focus will be to reorient our understanding
of Buddhist law toward a more interpretive and actorcentered framework . I will begin with a legal case,
narrated by a Tibetan, which took place in Lhasa in the
1940s and which will be presented in two parts. Each part
will be followed by an exeges is of the questions I found
myself asking as it was recounted, questions which came
from my own presumption s and preconceptions as an
American attorney with training in anthropology. Each of
the answers to these questions builds part of the cultural
backdrop in which this n arrator actor operated as a legal
actor- his use of myths, relations of power, concepts of
time, space and personal identity, the legal rituals, history,
religious principles, reasoning patterns, procedures, available roles, symbols-a backdrop which I call Legal
Cosmology. It is my view that for each case at law, a participant draws from this Legal Cosmology, these particular
sh ared categories, social practices and concepts, and fore-

grounds them into presentations for a particular set of
circumstances.
My third endeavor will be to question the ways in
which we are constructing our categories of meaning in
thi s inquiry, in pa rtic ul a r the t e rms "re li gio n,"
"Buddhism," "secular law," and "religious law." In attempting to reconsider and understand the modern con notations of these terms, I think that we will find layers
of epistemological-indeed, even ontological- assumptions about the nature of our inquiry which will help us
to reflect on, and perhaps introduce new questions into,
our exegetical and theoretical enterprise.

I

would like to begin with a story, edited from a verbatim taped transcript of a Tibetan layman wh o worked

• The cdicor is gra teft~lw Peter Gou.scludk, Divinity School Plt .D. student in rhe History of Heligions, for editinl! chis article from the original conference manuscript.
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as a lega l representative in the cap ital city of Lhasa, in
the 1940s. Kungo Tsewang Tamdin had been introduced
to me, by the Director of the Tibetan Library in
Dharmsala, India, as a very knowledgeable man who had
handled cases in the government courts for the Vaticanlike state of Sakya, as well as for private clients. The
conversations between Kungo Tsewang Tamdin and I
spanned several years in the mid 1980s in Dharamsala.
Here is a short excerpt:
Every year in the same month, almost a thousand [Sa
skya) monks traveled west from their h ome mon astery
in Khams [in eastern Tibet] to Ngor monastery in centra l Tibet to receive teachings from the Sa skya [hi gh
lamas]. When they came this long distance, they
begged food and clothing along the way from the people in the districts.
[Now) one year !learned that a man and his friends
had become very angry with [a large group of] monks
[for their insistent begging) and after a fight, h ad killed
two of them. This was a very terrible h appening and
became a well-known event in the entire area.
Now, the person who had killed the monks was a
member of the Tibetan army and so the local community [where the inc ident occurred] sent a petition to
the Tibetan Cabinet [in the government in Lhasa]. So
the man [who had done the killing) was brought to
that office in Lhasa and he was whipped with the "initial whip" by the guards of that office.
Then two women who h ad known the murdered Sa
skya monks well and were from their home village [in
Khams in eastern Tibet] came to see me [at h ome) and
asked that I would go into court for them. I said that I
had nothing to appear to the court for. They asked me
to appea l to the court for the sTong payment. For one
ordinary monk, [they sa id) the payment is 9 rDo rshad,
so for two monks it was 18 rDo tshad. [They said that)
if the monks had robbed or fought [prior to the murders], then the amount of the sTong payment would be
reduced . So, in response to the request of these women, I sa id that I would petition to the court office for
them.
So, I went to the office to the west of the city and
found that there were two very important Tibetan offi cials acting as judges in this case. One was of the
Cabinet Minister rank and the other was of the next
lower rank. Instead of carrying a written petition with
me, I just went to the office and mad e the request orally. After presenting the entire oral petition, the judges
told me they would consider the cla im of the women

and said that I should return when [all of the issues of]
the case [had been] decided.
Let's stop half way through this simple case. A lready, we
understand many things about this case, but we understand them through projections about our own legal
system which may indeed be mis-understandings. In order
to approximate what Tsewang Tamdin is representing as
he understands it, we need to know a number of things
about the Tibetan milieu, as he perceived them, such as:
the meaning of the word sTong; how the monks and army
officers were viewed in the society; when, how and for
whom Tsewang Tamdin could intercede; who signs a document and where; what language codes were used in each
particular setting, etc. The ways in which actors fashion
their own intersubj ective mean ings and narratives represent the heart of legal practice in this Buddhist soc iety. In
the next section we will investigate just what those
meanings and understand ings were for Tsewang Tamdin,
and find perhaps that many of our presumptions are misdirected.
THE CONCEPTS OF THE NATURE OF REALITY
AND ILLUSION, THE COSMOS AND TIME
scwang Tamdin commented to me several times in
reference to this case, that because the Tibetan legal
system acknowledged the Buddhist threefold nature of
reality, he was prepared for arguments shifting the
rea lity/illusion frame of this incident from the appearance
level of reality, the JJarikalpica in Sanskrit, to the relative
or /Jaricantra level or to the fin al perfected level of reality,
the parinispanna. When questioned as to what this meant,
he responded that he was poised to find out that the facts
as represented were not the real facts, th at is, to find out
that one or either of the monks were actually tulkus, reincarnations of their predecessors, or high level tantric
masters which would have significantly changed their
social value. He would not h ave been surprised tO have
been told that the army officer was not what he appeared
to be, ie., that he had some other religious identity.
Arguments mi ght be made th at this incident was a
karmic necess ity to burn off the bad seeds of the monks; it
might be rationalized in the context of ka rma due to some
prev ious relation between the part ies. He sa id that parties
had argued that a dea th was n ot a dea th at all but a
tran smi ss ion of life to another be ing staged as a death .
Whil e doubting that these arguments wou ld influence
the judges in a murder case, Tibetan legal representatives
h ad to be prepared for several possible reality hifts that
foregrounded the Buddh ist notion of the illusory nature
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In Tibet, the occupation of the defendant in a murder case determines the venue of the trial.

of this worldly life and the ultimate reality of perfected
vision.
The temporal dimensions of this case also markedly
determined our narrator's approaches and responses. Fine
distinctions made on the basis of the dates of particular
statutory changes, so common in western law, are not
strongly at issue here. We are not told in the story how
long after the murder the case was reported or how long
after that the defendant was in confinement, or even
which statute applied because of when it took place.
THE MANDALA OF THE LAW INCLUDING
INSTITUTIONS, SPACE AND LEGAL UNITS

H

ow did Tsewang Tamdin understand the relationship between the site of the case and the central
city courts? What were the spatial and temporal components of these relations? Tsewang related these ideas to
me, as many Tibetans had, using the root metaphor for
the Tibetan cosmos, a mandala pattern. The Tibetan
mandala presents the entire universe and all realms within a single essential plan, representing at one and the
same time the consistency of movement in/out and
up/down, the cyclical nature of rebirth, reified social and
spatial hierarchy, the universalized path of individual
mental conscience and the ultimate union of the sacred
and the secular in a single cosmic design. The mandala is
also the root metaphor for the levels of the legal administration in ever decreasing circles, from the outerlying
districts of the plateau, to the district headquarters, to the
governors offices, to the Cabinet in the capital city and,
ultimately, the central godhead of the Dalai Lama. This
form was repeated in Lhasa, for the central administration
building which housed the ]o wo, the most famous sacred
statue of the Sakyamuni Buddha in Tibet. Thus, mapping
the legal system of Tibet in mandala form both integrated
law into this pervasive religious schema and legitimized it
with a symbol of cosmic integration.
Why were the deaths of these two monks being handled not in ecclesiastical but in governmental courts?
Monastic institutions had their own court processes fol-
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lowing the Vinaya with appeal available, ultimately, to
the Dalai Lama. Murder and a few other serious offenses
committed by monks, resulted in their expulsion from the
monastic community and their treatment in the secular
courts. In Tibet, the occupation of the defendant in a
murder case determines the venue of the trial. In this
instance, the crime was committed by a member of the
Army, so the local people were responsible for reporting
the murder to the Cabinet in Lhasa which then assigned
it to the Office of the Army. Because the Army held an
ambiguous position in Tibetan society with its traditional
rejection of war, its offices were located outside of the city
and the central mandala of power.
How does the Tibetan secular court system with its
multiple levels of court-offices and standardized process of
appeal compare to the hierarchical layering of legal institutions in the West? There are few similarities between
the two systems. For example, most cases in Tibet could
be started at any level including the Cabinet. At each
level, there were several different types of procedures and
a variety of forums for a plaintiff to approach. Petitioners
had to reach consensus with the other party and with the
adjudicators in that forum before a suit was joined, or
taken up by the forum. Suits could travel up and down in
the system, that is, they could go to the local headman,
then to the Cabinet in official government procedures,
then out to conciliation with a lama, then down to a
stewart in a regional estate for decision, then back to the
Cabinet for closure. But even when the Cabinet accepted
a case that the parties had agreed to, the suit did not go
forward without their consent and one of the parties
could then start proceedings elsewhere. Flexibility, nondecay, overlapping jurisdiction, and consensus to forums
and procedures are among the many elements which
make the Tibetan legal system dissimilar from our own
and which make navigation through its channels so interesting. Crimes of murder, as in this case, were the
exception; they were routinely sent up through official
channels of the Cabinet in Lhasa for referral out for trial
at the appropriate upper level court, in this case the

Most cases in Tibet ... could be continually reopened. Individuals and circumstances
were presumed to be radically unique ...

Office of the Army outside the city. However, even in
murder cases, the forum could be contested and the court
could not proceed without the appearance and participation of all parties to the trial. Tsewang Tamdin mentioned
to me if they had refused to recognize his claim to the
payments he would have objected to the venue.

in this life by eliminating all occupations except that of a
prayer-wheel spinning mendicant. Fourth, for Tsewang
Tamdin and the other parties to this case, the Buddha
stood as an ideal, a constant referential standard in the
court for right ways of action.
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE MIND

MORAL NARRATIVES AND MYTHS

W

hat did our narrator see as the relationship
between Buddhism and a secular legal system? On
the one hand, Tsewang Tamdin presented no clear division between the religious and political realms or
between administration and law in his conversations.
Indeed, he presented inviolable connections, such as
fusion of the Buddha in the form of the Dalai Lama, with
the state and the Buddhist religion. Thus, the overarching picture is one of a unified cosmos represented by the
mandalic form of a government under the Buddha. On
the other hand, he clearly differentiated between the
moral law from the Vinaya (which outlined the Buddha's
rules and procedures for the monastery) and the law
codes of the secular state government (for use in the government courts). Thus, he saw them simultaneously as
one and the same, and as entirely distinct.
When I asked Kungo Tamdin about the moral dimensions of this case, he responded in several ways. First, he
said, murder was the most important of the Ten NonVirtuous Acts and particularly consequential to one's
karmic position when done in anger, as was the case here.
Second, he stated that it was essential to make particular
normative arguments in court. In this case, he had to
argue that the two female petitioners were aware of the
need to beneficially influence the future lives of the dead
monks by performing the correct religious rituals and that
this was their purpose in obtaining the money. Third, it
was presumed that the judge officiating was considering
the future life of the defendant when sanctioning. Indeed,
in other cases like this one, the amputation of limbs or
severing of tendons of the defendant was construed by the
judges as the best punishment because it promoted prayer

hen I asked Tsewang Tamdin about the repertoire
of concepts he used to frame his arguments in
court that first day, he began with the caveat that Tibet
had no legal concepts per se, only concepts from the
Buddha. That said, he moved on in the course of our
interviews to a variety of jurisprudential concepts pertinent in this case, such as the process of factoring by
which all ,acts including murder were assessed with
respect to the object, the motivation, the act and the
completion of the act. The importance of a mental conscience, particularly one that recognized right conduct
and moral self-regulation as the foundation of a moral
society, was an essential characteristic to be established
for any witness or party, proving that they were not, in the
words of the law codes, "acting for their own benefit,"
that they were speaking honestly, that they were working
to rehannonize themselves and the community and that
they were acting responsibly for their household or community. A third point in this case was that citation to
[Jrecedent carried no weight in Tibetan courts. Most cases
in Tibet, Tsewang Tamdin explained, could be continually
reopened, a feature he and others lauded. Individuals and
circumstances were presumed to be radically unique, that
is, not comparable to other persons or circumstances
regardless of how apparently similar they were. Therefore,
as a legal representative, he went into court without
recourse to layers of previous interpretations. References
at trial were made primarily to standards in the law codes
and to factoring of the circumstances on the basis of the
Buddhist principles.

W
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eeling more situated within the Tibetan context, let's
return to the Case of the Murdered Monks. Kungo
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... ritualized procedures and documentary practices were the core of the Tibetan legal system ...
Yet, they were never written down!

Tsewang Tamden continues his story:

;

Then sometime later I was called to the court. The
secretary brought the final decision document outside
and read it in front of the court waiting room [to all of
the participants]. I was then given a notice to come
back the day after tomorrow.
On that day, the secretary of the court again read
the decision and explained the court costs section and
the payment of the sTong and all the many other payments required. Then the secretary asked all sides of
the dispute to sign the decision document, including
the army man/murderer and myself. So, at the bottom
of the document, the murderer and I both signed and
sealed the document. Then the secretary turned to the
murderer and asked him for the sTong payment.
He offered it and the secretary took the sTong payment from the murderer. From this payment of 18 rDo
tshad, the [Head] secretary then subtracted the court
costs and the ink fees for the [drafting] secretaries and
handed the rest to me. There were three copies made
of the document and I received one. After that I left,
so that I did not find out about the other punishments
given to the murderer.
Then I went to see the two women who had asked
me to represent them. I gave them all the remaining
money and later they used it all for the funeral rites
and for other religious rituals for the future lives of the
monks. I then took an account from these women of
what they had spent and the offerings that they made
and sent the receipt for this to their home district.
Usually, the sTong payment goes to the relatives, but
this time the only people who knew the monks and
claimed the payments were these two women, so it
went to them. That was the end [of it].
Once again, we find ourselves faced with questions which
bring us to face our own assumptions.
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THE RITUALS OF THE GOLDEN YOKE
INCLUDING LANGUAGE AND ROLES
hat ki.nds o~ ritual processes were available in a
case ltke thts? There were at least four distinct
types of ritualized legal processes in Tibet: ( 1) visiting an
official at home, (2) an official court procedure (which
had over forty-four intricate steps), (3) conciliation
(which was a distinct area of procedure with its own history and vocabulary) and (4) other less ·formal rituals
such as rolling dice, plunging your hand in hot oil or
water, or visiting an oracle and swearing before a deity.
When the two women first visited our narrator, they
used the first form of these ritual procedures and saw him
at home. The actual trial before the Army court was an
official court process (the second form mentioned above)
which Tsewang described in only brief detail in this case.
These ritualized procedures and documentary practices
were the core of the Tibetan legal system throughout all
the territories of the plateau. Yet, they were never written
down!
What were the roles in the secular legal system and to
whom were they available? What did legal representatives
have to know to be skilled at their job? The courtroom
personnel for an official trial like this consisted of at least
two (usually three or more) judges, several clerks, a caretaker to announce the case, and often several helpers.
Most offices in Tibet were staffed by at least one monk
official and one lay official; in courts, these two officials
were the judges. The lay official positions were filled by
sons of nobles, sons of clerks for the larger families and
sons of private land owners who encouraged their children to get an education. Monk official positions were
filled with sons from the elite noble class and non-elite
trainees of all social levels who had entered the
monastery early and had proven to be particularly smart
and skilled. The role of conciliator was available to any
individual with wealth, religious devotion or good administration skills. Other less formal rituals-rolling dice,
visiting an oracle and swearing before a deity-were
arranged by a vadety of specialized practitioners.

W

Language plays a vital role in the structuring, processing and winning of law suits in Tibet.

Language plays a vital role in the structuring, processing and winning of law suits in Tibet. Forensic skill was
thought by Tibetans to be intimately related to Tibetan
Buddhist monastic debate and particularly Buddhist reasoning styles. Many of the important legal representatives
in Lhasa were either monks or individuals with some religious training. Because he was not monastically trained,
Tsewang Tamdin emphasized the other important legal
repertoire-knowledge of the law codes and the use of
ancient proverbs and phrases, many of which derived
from the ancient law codes.
Why was the murderer signing a final judicial document and proffering money in court? The concept of
consent to forums was also applied, in Tibet, to consent
to the actual decision made in a case. Tsewang Tamdin
stated that as the representative of the community of the
victims, he, the murderer and the other parties had to
first listen to and then read the complete statement of the
facts and the decision of the court. At that point, they
were expected to state any objections to the decision
which they might have. Then, given their consent and
consensus, the parties, even those to a murder trial, were
expected to sign the document to indicate their agreement to the final decision. Our narrator saw this process
as natural and not requiring an explanation, so I will have
to speculate about a few possible reasons for it. First, it
insured the penetration of the individual mental conscience of a party, which was the true center of all
decision-making and social control in Tibet. Second, for
a society with very little sanctioning power, it provided
some contractual (rather than penal) assurance that the
decision would be followed. Third, it impressed upon the
criminal the nature of his crime and the punishments
which he would have to accept. The "initial whip" given
by the guards when the defendant arrived was thought by
Tibetans to be a punishment which impressed upon the
criminal the severity of his or her acts and insured the
mindfulness necessary to keep him or her from repeating
the crime.

THE GRAMMAR OF THE LAW
hat ~oes t~1is story t~ll us ~bout the Tibetan law
code. Dunng other mtervtews, Tsewang Tamdin
read and discussed sections of the Tibetan law codes with
me as did other officials. However, most of my information for this response comes from collecting, compiling,
translating and annotating these texts myself with a former Tibetan monk official, Kungo Thubten Sangye.
Two points about the law codes are important to mention at this juncture: the law codes did not contain any
legal rules in the strong, formal, command-prescriptive
sense that we use that term. It strikes me that it is quite
possible that the Tibetan use of "weak rules," if I may call
them that, will be revelatory of how rules, particularly
legal rules, work in general. A second point is that their
law codes also did not contain any detailed rendering of
the four types of ritual legal procedure mentioned above,
arguably the most important aspect of Tibetan law. This is
an astonishing finding considering our western notions of
the centrality and power of legal procedures and law
codes. Legal procedure could only be collected in Tibet
through individual stories and case. studies, not through
the law codes.
But how is it, finally, that the two women from the
monks' village, laypeople from an outlying area without a
formal education, not only know about the sTong victim
compensation payments listed in the law codes but knew
how much the payments should be, who should receive
them and how one should go about t)etitioning for them
during a trial? The sTong system, one of the most distinguishing features of the law codes, was a nine-part
ranking system, by social and economic status, of all of
the individuals in Tibetan society from the Dalai Lama,
who ranked above the highest of the high, to
hermaphrodites and beggars who ranked below the lowest
of the low. Once the amount of the sTong was determined
from the victim's social level, it became the central figure
from which other payments could be calculated, such as
the degree of physical injury from the wound. The Case of
the Murdered Monks demonstrates both the layperson's

W
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knowledge of the sTong system ranking and its actual
operation and yet we are left with the question, how is it
that the average illiterate layperson had such a detailed
knowledge of information contained in the law codes?
Tsewang T'lmdin's answer was that much of the law codes
were generally known because they were compilations of
Tibetan customs.

T

his concludes our exegesis of the case. I would like to
shift to a brief consideration of some of the concepts
which I have been using for the case analysis to question
the epistemological and other assumptions upon which
these constructed categories of meaning are based.
Talal Asad in his latest book, Genealogies of Religion,
posits that terms such as "religion," "ritual" and "secular",
as they are currently employed in the literature, have
become culture-specific, modern constructs. The liberal
humanist principles of the Enlightenment changed the
meaning of these constructs by positing a mobile, creative
human actor who could actively engage in building a
modern secular nation state. Thus, the modern understanding of these terms compresses and encodes several
(foundational) assumptions such as the idea of self-constitution and self-choice, the strict division between the
religious and secular spheres, autonomy, personal consciousness, agency, teleological narratives, progressive
time and modern historicity. Given these encoded
assumptions, the contemporary Christian understanding of
religious ritual is as a symbolic repetitive act. The premodern Christian religious ritual, Asad argues, based on
a different ontology and epistemology, was understood as
a prescribed set of practices or performances which
depended on individual discipline and ability to guide the
initiate to the virtuous moral self. Asad's insights are
clearly relevant to Buddhist religious ritual. Hence, the
Buddhist religion of premodern times must be analyzed
without the modern assumptions of protean transformation of self, the fractured world, decentered communities
and the creative, individuated, autonomous actor.
A similar concern can be expressed about the modern
use of the word "law," which covers a wide panoply of
characteristics from generalized social control mechanisms in society, justice, forms of reasoning, fairness and
rules, to bureaucratic institutions, professional decisionmakers, courts and sanctions. Modern models of legal
systems such as Luhmann and Tuebner's autopoeisis theory, which depicts law as a detached system of authoritative regulation with an "essentially self-referential system
of communication that is cognitively open and normatively closed," are part of our own modern mythic
constructs about the nature of institutions in complex
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societies. While these models may be of some value to
sociologists and scholars of modern legal systems, they
provide very little guidance as to the nature of legal practice in pre-modern Buddhist countries.
How then should we go about understanding what we
mean when we ask questions about the movement of
"Buddhist law" across South Asia or the reception or
development of "secular law" within a Buddhist country
like Tibet? How can we avoid using terms that are already
loaded with modern meaning? One approach is to begin
with cases-circumstances which are temporally and
socially contextualized. For example, in response to the
question about "secular law" in Buddhist Tibet, it is possible to say that in the 1930s and 1940s, among individuals
such as Tsewang Tamdin, the legal system was not separate or in any way in opposition to the worldview of the
Buddha except perhaps to the extent that a judge
appeared to violate a Buddhist value. Instead, there was
the realm of society, wholly interpenetrated by and with
the religion of the Buddha, and within this realm were a
set of social institutions and practices demarcated as king
laws. This area was in consonance with the Vinaya in
that it was viewed as being based entirely on the Vinaya
and it included Buddhist means of factoring and Buddhist
forms of reasoning. But the kings laws were also definitely
not "Buddhist law" in that they were not for monks, but
for laypeople. They had a different historical development that was not considered part of the Tibetan religious canon. So, in the capital city of Lhasa, there was no
real secular sphere, as the term "secular" is understood in
modern, western societies.
This then is a single constructed picture of the relationship between the religious and secular legal spheres in
Tibet in the 1940s. Building from many such cases, one
can form this part of the Tibetan Legal Cosmology. How
then does comparison take place? Buddhist law and kings'
law in pre-modern Tibet do not match the modern distinction between religious law and secular law but it
might match quite well constructed cosmologies of law in
other pre-modern Buddhist societies. Contrasting richly
contextualized pictures, an exercise in comparative positionality, if you will, both allows for a thicker definition
and representation of the material that we wish to compare, and presents a possible antidote to the paralyzing
effects of a deconstructionist project which tends to relativize and delegitimize the large, comparative questions. o

